In distributed synthesis, we generate a set of process implementations that, together, accomplish an objective against all possible behaviors of the environment. A lot of recent work has focussed on systems with causal memory, i.e., sets of asynchronous processes that exchange their causal histories upon synchronization. Decidability results for this problem have been stated either in terms of control games, which extend Zielonka's asynchronous automata by partitioning the actions into controllable and uncontrollable, or in terms of Petri games, which extend Petri nets by partitioning the tokens into system and environment players. The precise connection between these two models was so far, however, an open question.
Introduction
Automating the construction of distributed systems is of great interest because of the complicated interplay between the system processes and with the environment. In a distributed system, each process must make its decisions based on incomplete information about the global system state. In distributed synthesis, we automatically construct such process strategies that, together, accomplish an objective against all possible behaviors of the environment. After some early results on synchronous distributed systems [23] , most work has focussed on the synthesis of asynchronous distributed systems with causal memory [10, 11, 19, 13, 9, 8] . Causal memory means that two processes share no information while they run independently; during every synchronization, however, they exchange their complete local histories. The study of the synthesis problem with causal memory has, so far, been carried out, independently of each other, in two different models: control games and Petri games. 
Examples
We illustrate the models by two examples. The examples demonstrate the use of control games and Petri games and their differences, which our translations overcome. Both examples belong to classes that are newly identified as decidable by the results of the paper. As a control game, consider the example of a mutex lock for a critical section between two independent threads 1 . The two threads are on the left and right of Fig. 1 and have only dotted uncontrollable actions whereas the possible implementations of the lock in the middle consist of unlabeled controllable actions and dotted uncontrollable actions. The three processes of the control game synchronize on common actions. Both threads can write the shared variable (w 1 , w 2 ) after obtaining the lock. The lock is obtained by requesting (r 1 , r 2 ) and then entering it (e 1 , e 2 ). Afterwards, the threads leave the lock (l 1 , l 2 ).
The possible lock implementations consist of nine states out of which five are used to react to the uncontrollable synchronizations with the two threads for requesting, entering, and leaving the lock. The lock has to react to both threads requesting the lock whereas the entering and leaving are individual states. The remaining four states are used for controllable actions after requesting and entering the lock. From these four states, the controller for the lock can decide on which uncontrollable action to synchronize next. When both threads obtain the lock, bad places are reached (b). The control game searches for a deadlock-free controller such that the bad places can never be reached. A correct controller follows the request of each thread by them entering and exiting the lock. This control game becomes decidable by our reduction to Petri games as it is a single-process system with bad places. Note that the asynchronous automaton has a cyclic communication structure.
As an example of a Petri game, consider the "burglary" system in Fig. 2 . A crime boss in environment place B decides to either burgle up-or downtown by firing transitions u and d. Depending on the choice, an undercover agent in system place U or a thug in environment place T are instructed by i u or i d . The undercover agent has to carry out the burglary to not blow her cover. The crime boss gets caught and interrogated (c) by a cop from system place C. The cop can send the flipped crime boss up-or downtown (s u , s d ) to catch the burglar (c u , c d ). The goal is to catch the burglar which is encoded by each of the four players terminating in a winning place. The information model of causal past is key for the existence of winning strategies. Only upon synchronization players exchange all information about their past. After the crime boss instructs for a location to burgle, only the crime boss and the respective burglar know about this decision. The cop only learns about the decision after catching the crime boss. A winning strategy for the cop catches and interrogates the crime boss and then uses her causal past to send the flipped crime boss to the correct location. A Petri Game for the synthesis of a police strategy is depicted. Grey places belong to the system whereas white places belong to the environment. Winning places are double circles.
The Petri game is decidable by our reduction to control games as it has an acyclic communication architecture and winning places. Note that the Petri game has two system and two environment players.
Background
We recall asynchronous automata [25] , control games [11] , Petri nets [24, 21] , and Petri games [9] .
Zielonka's Asynchronous Automata
An asynchronous automaton [25] is a family of finite automata, called processes, synchronizing on shared actions. Our definitions follow [11] . No global clocks exist and therefore two processes can perform differently many actions between synchronizations. The finite set of processes of an asynchronous automaton is defined as P. The distributed alphabet (Σ, dom) contains the finite set of actions Σ and their domain function dom : Σ → 2 P \ {∅}. A (deterministic) asynchronous automaton A = ({S p } p∈P , s in , {δ a } a∈Σ ) is defined by a finite set S p of local states for every process p ∈ P, the initial state s in ∈ p∈P S p , and a partial function δ a : p∈dom(a) S p . By L(A), we denote the set of sequences labeling runs from the initial state of this sequential automaton. The domain function dom leads to an independence relation I: two actions a, b ∈ Σ are independent, denoted (a, b) ∈ I, if they involve different processes, i.e., dom(a) ∩ dom(b) = ∅. Adjoint independent actions in sequences can be swapped. We obtain equivalence classes up to independence for sequences of actions which we call traces and denote by [u] I . The parallel composition of processes gives an asynchronous automaton: A (local) process is a tuple β = (Q, ϑ, v 0 ) where Q is the finite set of states, q 0 is the initial state, and ϑ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q a deterministic transition relation labelled by Σ. For a family of local processes {β p } p∈P , we define the parallel composition p∈P β p as an asynchronous automaton with (1) S p = Q p , (2) s in = p∈P q 0p , and (3) δ a (B) for B ∈ p∈dom(a) S p as: if for all p ∈ dom(a) and the state s p ∈ B with s p ∈ S p there exists a state s
− → p∈dom(a)
S′ p ∈ S p with (s p , a, s ′ p ) ∈ ϑ p then define δ a (B) = p∈dom(a) s ′ p , otherwise δ a (B) is undefined.
Control Games
consists of an asynchronous automaton A as game arena with a distribution of actions into controllable (system) actions Σ sys and uncontrollable (environment) actions Σ env and special states {S p } p∈P for each process used for the winning condition of the control game.
Plays(A) denotes the set of traces from L(A).
A system controller is a family of local controllers for each process. The local controllers use the causal history of the processes formalized as their view on other processes from their last synchronization. We formalize the p-view of a play u, denoted view p (u), as the smallest trace [v] I such that u ∼ I vy and y contains no action from Σ p = {a ∈ Σ | p ∈ dom(a)}. The p-view represents the causal past of process p. We define the set of plays that are p-views
A local controller for a process p is a function ̺ p : Plays p (A) → {a ∈ Σ sys | p ∈ dom(a)}. A global controller {̺ p } p∈P is a family of one local controller for each process. Plays(A, ̺) denotes the set of plays respecting a controller ̺ = {̺ p } p∈P and is defined as the smallest set containing the empty play ǫ and such that for every u ∈ Plays(A, ̺): (1) if a ∈ Σ env and ua ∈ P lays(A) then ua ∈ Plays(A, ̺) and (2) if a ∈ Σ sys and ua ∈ Plays(A) then ua ∈ Plays(A, ̺) subject to ∀p ∈ dom(a) : a ∈ ̺ p (view p (u)). Environment actions are always possible whereas system actions are only possible if allowed by the controllers of all participating processes. We define the set of maximal plays Plays
there is no action c with uc ∈ Plays(A, ̺). We define a set of special states {S p } p∈P for each process to define safety or reachability as winning condi-
for the strategy ⊤ allowing all actions, i.e., strategy σ is only allowed to terminate if the asynchronous automaton does. A safety-control game with bad states S p = B p is won by the system if a deadlock-avoiding global controller exists s.t. for all plays each process never reaches a bad state. A reachability-control game with winning states S p = W p is won by the system if a global controller exists s.t. for all maximal plays each process terminates in one of its winning states.
Petri Nets
A Petri net [24, 21 ] N = (P, T , F , In) consists of the disjoint sets of places P and of transitions T , the flow relation F as multiset over (P × T ) ∪ (T × P), and the initial marking In as multiset over P. The flow relation defines the arcs from places to transitions (P×T ) and from transitions to places (T × P) with their respective weights F (p, t) = k and F (t, p) = k. The state of a Petri game is represented by a marking M as multiset over places which positions M (p) tokens in all places p ∈ P. Elements of P ∪ T are called nodes. We define the preset (and postset) of a node x from Petri net N as the multiset pre N (x)(y) = F (y, x) (and post N (x)(y) = F (x, y)) for y ∈ P ∪ T . We require the preset and postset of transitions to be non-empty and finite. We may omit N if it is clear from the context which Petri net is considered. A transition t is enabled at a marking M if the multiset inclusion pre N (t) ⊆ M holds. An enabled transition t can be fired from a marking M resulting in the successor marking
decorate the components of the net. A Petri net is finite if it has only finitely many places and transitions and 1-bounded if at most one token resides in every place of every reachable marking. A transition t is concurrency-preserving if |pre(t)| = |post (t)|.
Branching Processes
To represent causal past, we recall branching processes [3, 16, 4] . Nodes x and y are in conflict (x ♯ y) if there exists a place p ∈ P \ {x, y} from which x and y can be reached, exiting p by different transitions. A node x is in self-conflict if x ♯ x. We write x<y if x ∈ pre(y). With ≤, we denote the reflexive, transitive closure of<. Nodes x and y are causally related if x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x. Nodes x and y are concurrent if they are neither causally related nor in conflict. The causal past of a node y is past(y) = {x | x ≤ y}.
An occurrence net is a Petri net N , where the pre-and postset of all transitions are sets, the initial marking coincides with places without ingoing transitions (∀p ∈ P : p ∈ In ⇔ |pre N (p)| = 0), all other places have exactly one ingoing transition (∀p ∈ P \ In : |pre N (p)| = 1), ≤ is well-founded (there is no infinite path following the flow relation backwards), and no transition is in self-conflict. An initial homomorphism from N 1 to N 2 is a function λ : P 1 ∪ T 1 → P 2 ∪ T 2 that preserves node type (λ(P 1 ) ⊆ P 2 ∧ λ(T 1 ) ⊆ T 2 ), preset and postset of transitions (∀t ∈ T 1 : λ[pre
, and initial marking (λ[In 1 ] = In 2 ). An initial branching process β = (N U , λ U ) of a Petri net N has an occurrence net N U and an initial homomorphism λ U : P U ∪T U → P ∪T that is injective on transitions with the same presets (∀t 1 , t 2 ∈ T U : (pre
Petri Games
A Petri game [9] G = (P S , P E , T , F , In, S) with S ⊆ P S ∪ P E has an underlying Petri net N = (P, T , F , In) with P = P S ⊎ P E where sets P S , P E , and S define system places, environment places, and special places. System places are grey circles, environment places white circles, and special places double places. A strategy of G is an initial branching process σ = (N σ , λ σ ) s.t. every not represented transition is uniformly forbidden by a system player
. We call this assumption justified refusal. A strategy is deterministic if each system player has at most one transition enabled for all reachable markings (∀M ∈ R(N σ ) :
strategy is deadlock-avoiding if at least one transition is enabled for each reachable marking as long as one transition is enabled in the underlying Petri net (∀M ∈ R(N σ ) : ∃t ∈ T :
A deadlock-avoiding strategy is safetywinning for bad places S = B if no bad place can be reached in the strategy. A finite strategy is reachability-winning for winning places S = W if each player terminates in a winning place. In both cases, deterministic strategies can be additionally required.
Game Equivalence
A minimum requirement for reductions between game models is to be winning-equivalent. The system has a winning strategy in one game if and only if it has a winning strategy in the translated other one. One simple reduction fulfilling this is to solve the game and to then return a minimal winning-equivalent game. Such a reduction is not desirable, especially since decidability in both control games and Petri games is still an open question [17, 7] . Instead our reductions preserve the underlying structure of the games. We propose strategyequivalence as an adequate equivalence notion. Our notion is based on weak bisimulation which is popular and powerful to relate concurrent systems represented as Petri nets [2, 1, 22] . For our purpose a bisimulation between the underlying Petri net and the asynchronous automaton is not sufficient. We want to express that a strategy and an equivalent controller allow for the same decisions by the environment and can react in the same way. In both models, controllers and strategies are defined based on the causal past of the players. Control games utilize local views whereas Petri games utilize branching processes. We consider a strategy in a Petri game and a controller in a control game equivalent if there is a weak bisimulation between the branching process of the strategy and the plays that are compatible with the controller. We refer to a shared core of transitions/actions as well as local ones (τ ). 
A Petri game G and a control game C are called strategy-equivalent if: for every winning strategy σ for G there exists a bisimilar winning controller ̺ for C and for every winning controller ̺ for C there exists a bisimilar winning strategy σ for G.
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Reduction from Petri Games to Control Games
We give our first reduction from Petri games to winning-equivalent control games, prove it correct, and show that for strategy-equivalence it is optimal for an exponential lower bound. We present the reduction for reachability as winning objective.
Construction
The reduction in Fig. 3 solves two differences between Petri games and control games: Firstly, a strategy in Petri games is defined as a global branching process whereas a controller in control games is locally defined per process. We dismantle Petri games into slices. Secondly, Petri games distribute players between system and environment whereas control games distinguish controllable and uncontrollable actions. We use commitment sets to solve this. Slices We dismantle the Petri game into slices which follow the course of one token each. We view the underlying Petri net as parallel composition of slices and then each slice as a process in the asynchronous automaton. We show the construction for sliceable Petri games. In Sec. 5.3, we outline how it can be generalized to concurrency-preserving Petri games. 
One can think of a slice as a finite state automaton where the token marks the current state. We view a Petri net as parallel composition of slices. For a family of slices {S} S∈S we define the parallel composition S∈S S as the Petri net with places i∈I P i , transitions i∈I T i , flow relation i∈I F i , and initial marking i∈I In i . All unions, except for the union of transitions, are disjoint. Transitions can be shared between multiple slices which forces synchronization. Figure 4b depicts two slices and Fig. 4a the parallel composition of the two slices. A Petri net N is sliceable iff it is the parallel composition of a family of slices {S} S∈S , i.e., N = S∈S S s.t. the slices partition P N . Sliceable Petri nets are concurrency-preserving and 1-bounded. Note that not every Petri net is sliceable even for concurrency-preserving, 1-bounded ones and a distribution in slices is not unique.
Commitment Sets
In control games actions are either controllable or uncontrollable whereas in Petri games players are distributed between the system and the environment. We overcome this difference by using commitment sets. The actions in the asynchronous Define P = S and the alphabet of the asynchronous automaton to be (Σ, dom) with:
and dom : Σ → 2 P :
S is the unique state s.t. In S = {q 0 } and ϑ S is given by:
Define C G as the parallel composition of each process Figure 3 The construction of the translated control game for a Petri game G = (PS, PE, T , F, In, W) distributed in slices {S} S∈S is depicted. Without the red parts this is the definition of CG. With the red parts this is the definition of CG.
automaton we build are all transitions in the original Petri net as uncontrollable actions and additional controllable local actions. The controller cannot restrict transitions with only environment places in their preset. To allow system places to block transitions (as possible in Petri games) they first choose a commitment set as a set of actions they want to allow via a controllable action. From these new states only the chosen transitions are outgoing.
We fix a sliceable game G = (P S , P E , T , F , In, W) and a distribution in slices {S} S∈S . We transform each slice into a process in the asynchronous automaton of the control game and hence use the terms slice and process interchangeably. Two different automata C G and C G are defined where the latter one is obtained if the red parts in Fig. 3 are included.
The actions are all original transitions T and local actions for places q ∈ P N to choose commitment sets A ⊆ post N (q). We define the domain of the actions s.t. τ -actions are local to the respective slice and other actions involve every slice that synchronizes on the corresponding transition. For each slice S we define a local process β S with states representing the places of its slice P S and the commitment sets (q, A) for each system place q ∈ P S ∩ P S .
The τ -actions happen locally from states representing system places to states representing chosen commitment sets. From these states only transitions from A can happen leading to the corresponding state from the postset of the transition. From states representing environment places all outgoing transitions can happen directly leading to the corresponding state from the postset of the transition. The initial state carries over from the initial marking and τ -actions are defined controllable whereas all other actions T are uncontrollable. States and commitment sets corresponding to winning places become winning states. We assume that each process enables at most one commitment set.
An example reduction is depicted in Fig. 4 . On the left, the system player in A has two outgoing transitions a and b which result in four commitment set states {A} × 2 {a,b} reachable by controllable τ -transitions. Transition a returns to the initial state from the two commitment sets allowing it whereas b reaches the state B from the two commitment sets allowing it. From B, the empty commitment set can be chosen. The slice of the environment player results in the automaton on the right which directly goes via action a or c to state D.
Non-Determinism
We define C G to enforce deterministic strategies by preventing configurations from C G where the translated strategy for the Petri game is non-deterministic. We can use the commitment sets to detect non-determinism. We add uncontrollable synchronizations if commitment sets are chosen s.t. two or more transitions are enabled from a system place: For every state where the strategy has chosen a commitment set, i.e., is in a state (q, A), we want to prohibit a situation where two distinct actions (t 1 and t 2 ) from A are enabled.
To detect these cases we use (q,A) [t1,t2] -actions. The action fires (and moves every involved process to the state bad S from which no winning configuration can be reached) if (1) one process is in a state (q, A) with two distinct actions t 1 , t 2 ∈ A and (2) other processes are in states that enable t 1 and t 2 . The three red cases for actions of Fig. 3 cover exactly these situations. The first line ensures (1) whereas the second and third line cover (2): We ensure that each process that is needed to enable t 1 and t 2 is indeed in a state that enables the two actions. We distinguish between system and environment places: For each system place it is necessary that the strategy enables t 1 if the place is in the preset and enables t 2 if the place is in the preset by being in a corresponding commitment set. For each environment place it is only necessary to be in the right state, i.e., a state from which both of the transitions are enabled when the place is in the respective preset.
Correctness
We prove the reduction from Fig. 3 correct by outlining the translation of winning strategies in both directions. We relate a marking M and a play u if M describes exactly the situation that results from the observable actions (actions from T ) in u. τ -actions are only used to choose commitment sets. Because both game models describe causal past the information local to a process in a related marking and play are identical. This allows translations between strategies and controllers. Details can be found in Appendix A. Translating a Strategy for G to a Controller for C G For any trace u in C we consider the projection to original transitions (i.e., ignore all τ -actions). Any linearization of such a trace is a valid sequence of actions in N . The only states in C from which the strategy can control any behavior (in terms of controllable actions) are of the form q ∈ P S . If a process p is in such a state she simulates the projection of her local view in the strategy. In the resulting marking there is a place q ′ that belongs to her current state (λ(q ′ ) = q). This place carries the same information (in terms of her causal past) as the process does (in terms of her local view). The actions enabled from this place are post σ (q ′ ). The controller now enables exactly these actions by allowing τ (q,λ(post σ (q ′ ))) and forbidding all other controllable actions. Since the controller simulates the strategy it allows the same behavior the strategy allows. This enables bisimilarity. In Appendix A.2 we formalize this strategy and show that if the strategy of the Petri game is deterministic then -actions can never occur. Translating a Controller for C G to a Strategy for G Given a controller we can incrementally build our (possibly infinite) strategy. We start by adding the initial marking and add the correct labels to λ. Every system place q in the so far constructed strategy belongs to a process in C G . We consider the transitions in its causal past which can be viewed as a trace. From the causal past it is possible to add local τ -actions such that a controller compatible play is obtained. This trace carries the same causal past as q. The strategy mimics the decision made by the controller on this trace. We incrementally consider every reachable marking and add new places and transitions according to the decision of the system places in the current marking. For a formal definition we refer to Appendix A.3. From a winning controller for C G we can compute a winning, bisimilar strategy for G. A winning controller for C G furthermore avoids any uncontrollable -actions and results in a deterministic strategy.
◮ Proposition 3. G and C G are strategy-equivalent. G and C G are strategy-equivalent if we consider deterministic Petri game strategies.
Generalisation to Concurrency-Preserving Games
Our previous reduction builds processes from a slice distribution of the Petri game. This is limiting since even concurrency-preserving Petri games may not be sliceable. The notion of slices is too strict for our purposes: Our reduction requires to distribute the global movement of the Petri game in local behavior, a partitioning of the places is not necessarily needed. Singular Net Distribution We introduce the new concept of singular nets (SN) and singular net distributions (SND). A singular net is similar to a slice but does not partition the places. Instead it is equipped with a labelling function assigning to each place and transition in the singular net a place or transition in the original net. This labelling allows us to split up places and transitions by equally labelled copies. A singular net distribution is the parallel composition of singular nets that show the same behavior as the original net: Every transition in the original Petri net can be matched with an equally labelled transition between the singular nets and vice versa. We can build our previous reduction with an SNdistribution instead of a slice-distribution. We only need to ensure that controllers cannot distinguish between equally labelled transitions by limiting the commitment sets to original transitions. Figure 5 depicts a concurrency-preserving Petri game and two possible SNDs. The reader can convince herself that both SNDs have similar branching behavior to the original net. For space reasons, an informal description of singular nets is given. In Appendix B, we give the formal definitions of singular nets and singular net distributions and prove that every concurrencypreserving net has an SND. We state our first main result: 
◮ Corollary 5. G has a winning strategy if and only if C G has a winning controller. G has a winning deterministic strategy if and only if C G has a winning controller.
The blow-up for actions can be kept polynomial by a tree construction to choose the commitment set. For a bound on the number of outgoing transitions the translation is of polynomial size.
Lower Bound
We prove that there is a family of Petri games where every strategy-equivalent control game must have exponentially many states. We introduce a two player Petri game where both players possess different information. Only one controls a set of transitions which need to be uncontrollable to prohibit that the other player controls them. Since control games are limited to controllable and uncontrollable actions the only way to make these transitions controllable by only one player is to choose local enabling actions and hence require exponentially many states. The detailed construction can be found in Appendix A.4.
◮ Theorem 6. There is a family of Petri Games s.t. every strategy-equivalent control game (with an equal number of players) must have size at least
Ω(d n ) for a d > 1.
Reduction from Control Games to Petri Games
We give our second reduction from control games to winning-equivalent Petri games, prove it correct, and show that for strategy-equivalence it is optimal for an exponential lower bound. We present the reduction for safety as winning objective.
Figure 6
The construction of the translated Petri game GC for a control game C = (A, Σ sys , Σ env , {Bp} p∈P ) is depicted. Environment places for commitment sets are introduced.
Construction
We fix a control game C = (A, Σ sys , Σ env , {B p } p∈P ) and transform it into a strategy-equivalent Petri game G C . Our reduction is depicted in Fig. 6 . An action a in the control game can fire from different configurations of the processes in dom(a), i.e., all configurations in domain(δ a ). To model this in a Petri game we have to duplicate such actions into multiple transitions, one for each configuration from which a can fire (|domain(δ a )| many copies).
In the control game actions are either controllable or uncontrollable. In the Petri game we want to mirror this with system and environment places. Each local state is represented as a system place. From these places the strategy can choose from a set of controllable τ -transitions to places encoding commitment sets. We need to duplicate the transitions for every possible combination of commitment sets to have unique presets. They hence have the form (a, B, {A s } s∈B ) where a is the action in the control game, B ∈ domain(δ a ) is the configuration from which a can fire, and {A s } s∈B are the involved commitment sets from B. We identify such actions with a for the bisimulation. If a is controllable it fires if every involved process has agreed on this (by choosing her commitment set). This is exactly the case when a ∈ A s for every s ∈ B. If a is uncontrollable it fires from the places containing a commitment set of involved processes but does not consider their commitment sets. The crucial observation is that we need to force the system to always choose a commitment set. If a system player decides to refuse any commitment set she would prohibit uncontrollable actions. A controller in a control game on the other hand has no such possibilities. In Sec. 6.3 we show how to force the strategy to choose a commitment set for reachability and safety.
If we consider games with safety objectives we have to prevent deadlocking commitment sets. We hence add global transitions (involving every token) leading to a bad place whenever the commitment sets are such that no further actions are possible even though the underlying automaton would allow so. The formal construction is in Appendix C.1. Figure 7 depicts an example translation. The strategy cannot win this game: The uncontrollable action b can always happen in the Petri game, independent of the commitment set for place A. If a player refuses to commit, we can enforce a global deadlock. If one of the two tokens refuses to allow c (the blue places) a (losing) deadlock detecting transition will fire.
Correctness
Figure 7 Control game C (a) and translated Petri game GC (b). Commitment sets without outgoing transitions are omitted. For safety there are deadlock detecting transitions leaving from every combination of commitment sets of E and C with at least one in a blue place. Challenger transitions leave from every commitment place to good places.
We show that our translated Petri game and the control game are strategy-equivalent, if we consider strategies for Petri games that always choose a commitment set. We give an informal description how the strategy translation works. For a formal translation including the formal proofs we refer the reader to Appendix C. Translating Controllers to Strategies For a controller ̺ for C we build a strategy σ for G C . We incrementally add places and consider the transitions in their causal past. We observe that if we ignore all τ -transitions in the causal past we obtain a play in C. Controller ̺ enables controllable actions and the strategy chooses the appropriate commitment sets. Translating Strategies to Controllers For a strategy σ for G C we build a controller ̺ for C. We simulate a play in C in the strategy. The marking reached in this simulation contains a unique place corresponding to the process. The controller allows exactly the controllable actions in the commitment set.
◮ Theorem 7. C and G C are strategy-equivalent
Enforcing Commitment
Our construction assumes strategies to always choose a commitment set. We outline how we can enforce this for reachability and safety objectives which requires more effort in the safety case: Reachability For reachability objectives we restrict the winning places. For each winning local state in the control game we mark only the states with chosen commitment set as winning. Strategies that refuse to commit are thus not winning. Safety For safety objectives it is difficult to force commitment since firing fewer transitions does not reach bad places. The insight for forcing commitment is to use the deadlockavoidance stated for Petri games for control games. Deadlocks describe a global property of the game. In our reduced Petri game we want local deadlock-avoidance in the sense that the system token has to choose a commitment set. It is important that this is not the same as global deadlock-avoidance, where a single player able to play locally would allow every other player to refuse to commit without being deadlocked. We use an additional environment player as a universal challenger. The challenger can at any point suspect a player to have reached a local deadlock. He stops every token that has committed by allowing him to move to a final state. Every such player hence terminates and the player (or group of players) that refused to commit results in a global deadlock. As soon as the challenge occurred all transitions leading to bad places are disabled. When challenged the game is won if and only if there is no deadlock. The important observation is that the players do not know whether the challenger suspects them or not. They cannot adjust their strategy depending on the challenge. For the formal construction we refer to Appendix C.5.
◮ Proposition 8. The game with challenger G ch C has a winning strategy iff G C has a winning strategy where every system place always chooses a commitment set.
Lower Bounds
We can prove an exponential lower bound. For a single process asynchronous automaton with a state where controllable and uncontrollable actions leave, there must be environment states from which the uncontrollable actions and any combination of controllable actions leave. For safety objectives, we have to assume that winning strategies cannot play infinitely many τ -transitions. We refer to Appendix C.6 for formal construction and proof. 
New Decidable Classes
We exemplarily show one transferrable class of decidability for control games and Petri games to show the applicability of our translations and the transferred new decidability results. New Decidable Control Game A process in a control game is a environment process if all its action are uncontrollable. A system process is one that is not an environment process.
◮ Corollary 10. Control problems with at most one system process are decidable.
Proof. We can adopt our reduction to not add a system decision-place if there are no outgoing controllable actions. Hence all environment processes do not introduce any system places to the Petri game. Decidability follows from [8] . ◭
New Decidable Petri Games
Given a Petri game 
Related Work
Petri games are EXPTIME-complete for a bounded number of system players and one environment player [9] as well as for one system player and a bounded number of environment players [8] . Bounded synthesis has been proposed as semi-decision procedure to find winning strategies [5, 6] . Both the decision procedure and bounded synthesis are implemented in the tool Adam [7, 6] . There is a growing benchmark collection for Petri games [12] . For control games, there are non-elementary decidability results for restrictions on the dependencies of actions [10] and for acyclic communication architectures [11, 19] . Decidability of process-based control games has also been obtained for restrictions on the synchronization behavior [14, 15] . Recently, results on control games have been unified and extended by a new proof technique for the class of decomposable games [13] .
A first study relating different game models for distributed synthesis was carried out on action-based vs. process-based control games [20] . Before our paper, the precise connection between control games and Petri games was open.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided the first formal connection between control games and Petri games. With our translations, existing and future decidability results can be transferred between the two game models. It should be possible to adapt our translations to other winning conditions. Another interesting direction for future work is to study unified game models that combine features from control games and Petri games. 
A Formal Reduction of Petri Games to Control Games
In this appendix section, we define and prove the reduction of Petri games to control games formally. We give some notation, translate strategies to controllers, controllers to strategies, and give a lower bound.
A.1 Notation
We define the auxiliary mapping ζ :
S∈S
Q S \ {bad S } → P assigning to each local processstate in C G the corresponding place in G:
We can extend this definition to global states by defining for each global state (q p ) p∈P a corresponding marking in the Petri net by:
We define u (↓T ) : Σ ≡ → T ≡ as the projection of a trace over Σ to actions from T . It is easy to see that this projection is invariant under commutation of independent letters and hence well-defined. For a place q, past(q) denotes all nodes in the past of q, i.e., the causal past. With past T (q) we denote all transitions in this past. These nodes together with the order ≤ define a partially ordered set in the obvious way. We define N [▽ κ ] as the marking that is reached by firing κ in N . It holds that In
As our bisimulation we define M ≈ R e iff N σ [▽ e (↓T ) ] = M This captures the idea that a marking and play are bisimilar if they are reached with the same observable trace. We can use this bisimulation in both translation giving us an even stronger result than required in the definition of strategy-equivalence. By construction the bisimilar marking and state are equally labelled:
Proof. Follows since for all a ∈ T , for all B ∈ domain(δ a ) the following holds ζ(B) = pre N (a) and ζ(δ a (B)) = post N (a). ◭ By construction of C G each process describes one token. Petri games and control games both use the causal past information model. We defined M ≈ R e if both describe the same state of the game, that is M is reached with the observable actions in e. Each process in an automaton participates in exactly the same actions as the slice it belongs to. So if M ≈ R e each token in M has the same information (in terms of his causal past) as the p-view of the corresponding process p of e:
) (↓T ) (where both a viewed as partially ordered sets)
Proof. By definition of the local view it holds that e = view p (e) e ′ and since the τ actions are local e (↓T ) = view p (e) (↓T ) e ′ (↓T ) . e ′ (↓T ) contains no action from Σ p . Since all actions in e ′ (↓T ) are not in Σ p it is easy to see that firing them in the strategy will not add or remove any token from places λ 
Since this holds for all linearization of view p (e) (↓T ) they are also identical if viewed as a partially ordered set. ◭
As a direct consequence we get:
Proof. For the place q ∈ M ∩ λ −1 (P p ) it holds that past T (q) = view p (e) (↓T ) (by Lemma 13). By firing view p (e) (↓T ) in N σ the place q must hence be reached
A.2 Translating Strategies to Controllers
For every (not necessary winning) strategy N σ for G we define a controller ̺ σ = {f p } p∈P for C G and C G :
For p ∈ P and u ∈ Plays p (C G ):
1.
If state p (u) ∈ P E then all outgoing transitions are uncontrollable (by construction) and we define f p (u) = act(state p (u))
2.
If state p (u) = (q, A) for some q ∈ P S and A ⊆ post S (q). Then all outgoing transitions are uncontrollable and we define f p (u) = A (= act(state p (u))).
3.
If q = state p (u) ∈ P S , we again distinguish two cases a. u (↓T ) is a valid sequence of transitions in the strategy N σ and M = N σ [▽ u (↓T ) ] (to be formal: take the transitions labelled with u (↓T ) ). Then there exists a unique system place q ∈ M ∩ λ −1 (P p ). We define f p (u) = { τ (statep(u),λ(A)) } where A = post σ (q).
b. u (↓T )
is no valid transition sequence in the strategy N σ . Then we set f p (u) = act(state p (u)) ∩ Σ sys . This case will never occur if u is a strategy compatible play.
If state p (u) = bad
p there are no outgoing transitions, so f p (u) = ∅ It is easy to verify that the defined strategy does not block uncontrollable actions and is well-defined under the commutation of independent letters and is therefore indeed a strategy. When constructing plays that are compatible with the strategy ̺ σ , f p is only applied on plays that are compatible with ̺ σ and case 3b will never occur. To construct a well-defined strategy we nevertheless have to include this case.
Strategy-Equivalence
We can prove that σ and ̺ σ are in fact bisimilar w.r.t. ≈ R . We first ignore all the E.
Proof. Since M ≈ R e we know that N σ [▽ e (↓T ) ] = M . From Lemma 12 we get that ζ(state(e)) = λ(M ). We want to show that t is enabled in M . This would imply that M [ t M ′ and M ′ ≈ R e is a trivial consequence. From ζ(state(e)) = λ(M ) and by construction it follows that t can fire from λ(M ). Suppose it is not allowed by the strategy. Then there is a system place q ∈ M with t ∈ post (λ(q)) but t ∈ λ(post σ (q)). λ(q) belongs to some slice (process) p, i.e., q ∈ M ∩ λ −1 (P p ). We know that λ(q) = ζ(state p (u)). By construction of dom we know that p ∈ dom(t). So since e ′ = e t is a ̺ σ -play we know that t ∈ f p (view p (e)). Hence state p (u) must have the form (λ(q), A) with t ∈ A and there must be an action τ (λ(q),A) in e. Let e τ ⊑ e be the prefix obtained by removing the last such action (this is always possible). So
Proof. Obvious consequence from the definition of
Proof. Since M ≈ R e we know that N σ [▽ e (↓T ) ] = M . From Lemma 12 we get that ζ(state(e)) = λ(M ). Transition t is enabled in M and hence for every place q in M with λ(q) ∈ pre N (t) it holds that t ∈ λ(post σ (q)) (1). Let e τ be e extended with as many τ actions as possible s.t. no τ -action is possible after e τ . Now consider every process p ∈ dom(t). It is easy to see that ζ(state p (e τ )) = q for q ∈ pre(t) (because of ζ(state(e τ )) = λ(M ) and the definition of dom). For every p ∈ dom(t) s.t. ζ(state p (e τ )) ∈ P S we know that state p (e τ ) = (q, A p ) (since e τ is maximal with regards to τ -actions and ̺ σ always allows a τ action). It remains to show that t ∈ A p for every such p ∈ dom(a). If this would be the case we know e τ t is a ̺ σ compatible sequence and M ′ ≈ e τ t is an obvious consequence. Let e − τ be the trace that results from e τ by removing as many τ actions as possible. So after e − τ , every p ∈ dom(t) has not chosen her commitment set. For every A p (with p ∈ dom(a)) it holds that 
Deterministic Strategies
When we consider C G instead of C G we can show that the extra added -transitions can actually never be taken, if ̺ σ is constructed from a deterministic strategy of the Petri game. Intuitively a -transition can be fired when multiple processes choose their commitment sets (states of the form (q, A)) such that two transitions are enabled from these commitment set. In deterministic strategies for Petri games this can not happen. This idea is made precise in the following lemma:
◮ Lemma 20. If N σ is deterministic, then there is no ̺ σ compatible play in C G that reaches a bad place.
Proof. Suppose the opposite, i.e., there is a ̺ σ compatible play u that reaches a bad place. W.l.o.g. u = u ′ (q,A) (t1,t2) with q ∈ P S , A ⊆ post σ (q), t 1 , t 2 ∈ A, and there is no action in u ′ .
We know that (q,A) (t1,t2) is enabled from state(u ′ ) and we can conclude that there is a M with M ≈ R u ′ . It holds that ζ(state(u ′ )) = λ(M ). We will show that (1) for every process p ∈ dom(t 1 ) and the corresponding place q ′ , i.e.,
, there is a t 1 labelled transition enabled in q ′ . The same holds for t 2 . Furthermore we show that (2) there is a place q ′ ∈ M from which a transition labelled t 1 and a transition labelled t 2 is enabled. Since all places in M are concurrent and N σ is a strategy (justified refusal holds) we now that there must be two transitions labelled t 1 and t 2 that are enabled from M . This contradicts the assumption that N σ is deterministic. We first show (1): For every p ∈ dom(t 1 ) there is a unique place q ′ with q t2) ) so the -action must be enabled from state p (u ′ ). It is also an easy check to verify that if -action is enabled, then t 1 ∈ post (ζ(state p (u ′ ))). Now distinguish two cases:
(P E ), i.e., q ′ is a environment place. In this case every transition is allowed, so in particular there is aṫ 1 ∈ post σ (q ′ ) with λ(ṫ 1 ) = t 1 . q ′ ∈ λ −1 (P S ), i.e., q ′ is a system place. In this case state p (u ′ ) has the from (λ(q ′ ), B). By definition (since t 1 ∈ post (λ(q ′ ))) we now that t 1 ∈ B (the -action is enabled, definition of ). By definition of ̺ σ , B = λ(post σ (q ′ )) so from t 1 ∈ B we can conclude that there is aṫ 1 ∈ post σ (q ′ ) with λ(ṫ 1 ) = t 1 .
Note that theṫ 1 above can all be different. We only showed that there is some transition labelled t 1 . The fact that there is also a shared one follows from justified refusal. The case for t 2 is symmetric. We now prove (2): We will show that there is a system place q ′ ∈ M from which the transitionsṫ 1 andṫ 2 with λ(ṫ 1 ) = t 1 and λ(ṫ 2 ) = t 2 are both enabled. By construction there must be a process p with state p (u ′ ) = (q, A) (otherwise could not have been fired). The corresponding place is the unique q ′ with q
(P p ). By construction transitionsṫ 1 andṫ 2 are enabled from this place (since t 1 , t 2 ∈ A) . ◭ Using Lemma 20 we can can even build a winning strategy for C G if the winning Petri game strategy is deterministic. In this case we can simply ignore the -actions. It is easy to see that every strategy for C G is also one for C G : The added -action only prohibit some global configurations of the automaton.
◮ Theorem 21. If σ is a winning strategy for G, ̺ σ is a winning controller for C G and bisimilar to σ.
If σ is a winning, deterministic strategy for G, ̺ σ is a winning controller for C G (and for C G ) and bisimilar to σ.
A.3 Translating Controllers to Strategies
Given a controller ̺ for C G . We assume w.l.o.g. from each local state that the controller ̺ will allow exactly one τ -action: Since τ -actions are local and we only consider winning strategies, every possible choice must be winning and we can restrict to one τ -action. If no τ -action is enabled we can always enable the τ (,∅) action which will also result in a deadlock state. We call this assumption ⋆. Given a controller (not necessary winning) ̺ = (f p ) p∈P for C G (or for C G ) that satisfies ⋆, we incrementally construct a strategy N σ̺ for G: For construction purposes we label each place in the partly constructed branching process with the transitions that are enabled from this place by the controller. Formally this is a function µ :
We also define :
Intuitively to construct the strategy we need to decide for every place in the so far constructed branching process which transitions should be allowed. We therefore want to translate the knowledge (causal past) of this place to a valid trace in C G . The controller ̺ will then decide which actions should be enabled from this place. Our objective is therefore to build a valid trace that has the "same information" as the causal past of a node.
There is one major technical obstacle: In the branching process (the so far constructed strategy), looking at the transitions yielding to this place only (i.e., ignore all places in the causal past) is not enough to build a valid trace. In the controller by definition each action from a system place can only fire if it is preceded by a local transition of the form τ (_,_) . We therefore need to include these local actions to the past in such a way that the resulting trace is guaranteed to be compatible with the controller ̺. There are multiple ways to do this: For instance we can simulate each prefix and then observe the decision by the controller. To really emphasize that the information about the local τ actions can be reconstructed from the causal past we show that these information can be reconstructed from the places in the past. By using µ we can save the decision of the strategy at a place and can therefore include the local τ -transitions in such a way that we obtain a ̺ compatible play. This is done by : Transitions are mapped to transitions in C G , environment places are ignored (ǫ) since we do not need to have a preceding τ -action and for system places we ask µ to tell us which transitions have been enabled from this place. This way we can include the τ -transition.
We start by creating places for the initial marking In σ̺ and extend λ s.t. λ(In
Now suppose there is a reachable marking M that has not yet been processed in the so far constructed strategy. We build a set of transitions ∆ M as follows: Every place q ∈ M belongs to a unique slice/process S, i.e., λ(q) ∈ P S .
If q is a system place, i.e., q ∈ λ −1 (P S ): We collect the partially ordered past(q) in the already constructed strategy and from this compute u = (past(q)), i.e., apply point wise. This is well-defined. We again do a case distinction:
u is a ̺-compatible play and state S (u) = λ(q):
Otherwise: Define A S M = ∅. This case will never occur. If q is an environment place, i.e., q ∈ λ −1 (P E ):
We save this decision by the controller for the future by setting
M is the set of transitions that are possibly enabled from this marking. We filter by defining ∆ M = {t ∈ T N | ∀S ∈ S : t ∈ T S ⇒ t ∈ A S M }, i.e., filter for the transitions where every slice that needs to agree on this transitions does indeed agree. We now want to enable exactly these transitions from ∆ M from M .
For every t ∈ ∆ M : We check if there already exists a transition t ′ with pre
If it already exists, we do not add anything. If it does not exist: We create a new transition t ′ and set pre σ̺ (t ′ ) = λ −1 (pre N (t)) ∩ M and extend λ with λ(t ′ ) = t. We also add a new place q ′ for every q ∈ post N (t) with λ(q ′ ) = q and set pre σ̺ (q ′ ) = {t ′ }. We then indicate the marking M as processed and continue with another unprocessed marking.
This construction of the (unfolded) strategy does either terminate, i.e., the (unfolded) strategy is finite or continues forever and constructs an infinite strategy.
◮ Lemma 22. N σ̺ is a (not necessarily winning) strategy for G
Proof. It is easy to verify that the constructed net N σ̺ is a branching process. We need to prove the following: Justified refusal: Suppose there is a transition t in N that has not been added to the strategy and would be enabled in a marking M in the strategy (i.e., pre N (t) ⊆ λ(M )). If t has not been added to the strategy we can conclude that t ∈ ∆ M for the respective marking M . Denote with seq(σ) the transition sequences compatible with σ. For every σ it holds that seq(σ) = {ǫ, a, b, a t, b t | t ∈ B} for some B ⊆ {t 1 , · · · , t n }. Conversely for every such B there exists a σ s.t. seq(σ) has exactly this form.
We would like to convert G to a strategy-equivalent control game C. Obviously our reduction should satisfy T ⊆ Σ. We treat C as a black box and deduce facts about it:
Proof. We first prove that a and b are uncontrollable. Suppose w.l.o.g. that a is controllable. Then there exists a controller ̺ s.t. one of the processes involved in a always forbids it. Therefore every ̺ compatible sequence of actions can have any form but does not contain any action a. By assumption C and G are strategy-equivalent so there exists a bisimilar strategy σ. By the previous considerations we know that seq(σ) = {ǫ, a, b, a t, b t | t ∈ B} for some B. In particular a ∈ seq(σ). This contradicts the assumption. Hence a and b must be uncontrollable. We next show that every t i is uncontrollable. Suppose one of them (e.g., t i ) is controllable. We know that a or b must always precede any t-transition. There hence must be a process p with t i ∈ Σ p s.t. whenever t i occurs p can deduce from his local view whether a or b happened. There is a strategy σ for G s.t. seq(σ) = {ǫ, a, b, a t, b t | t ∈ B} for B = {t 1 , · · · , t n } (i.e,. allowing everything). By assumption there is a strategy-equivalent controller ̺. We informally modify ̺ using process p: Whenever a happened forbid t i . Whenever b happened change nothing. Call this modified controller ̺ ′ . By assumption there exists a strategy-equivalent strategy (to ̺ ′ ) for G. Since ̺ ′ makes a decision depending on whether a or b happened we deduce that 
B Singular Net Distributions
In this appendix section we give a formal definition of singular nets and singular net distribution and prove that every concurrency-preserving Petri net has such a distribution. Our reduction builds processes based on a distribution of the Petri game into slices. This is limiting as even concurrency-preserving, 1-bounded games must not be sliceable. In this section we formally generalize the construction to concurrency-preserving Petri games, i.e., only the number of players has to stay the same. We therefore introduce the notion of a singular net distribution. This is an approach to observe local behavior of tokens in a Petri net. In slices we enforce that the places of the Petri net are partitioned among the slices. By contrast, singular nets allow for duplicates of transitions and places.
◮ Definition 34. A singular net (SN) of a Petri net N is a pair (S, π) where S
is a Petri net with |In S | = 1 and ∀t ∈ T S : |pre(t)| = |post (t)| = 1 and π is a mapping P S ∪ T S → P N ∪ T N with the following properties:
where π is applied pointwise to pairs) A singular net captures the movement of a token. The fourth restriction guarantees that it is always finite. If we distribute a net into slices we implicitly preserve the behavior by enforcing that the places of the slices form a partition of the net. If we allow for copies we need to explicitly state that the behavior of the original net is preserved; that is: every move in the original net can be matched by an equally labelled move in the SN-distribution.
◮ Definition 35. A singular net distribution (SN-distribution) for a Petri net N is a family of singular nets {S} S∈S with
and the following attributes: In a distribution each singular net describes one token in N . The places of the singular nets are disjoint but they can share transitions. This will enable us to build the parallel composition and still enable synchronization. The interesting property is the fourth one: Suppose there is a transition in the original Petri net like a in Fig. 5 . There are now two possible sets of tokens that can be consumed by a: Either the first token in A and the one in B or the second token in A and the token in B. Since all tokens are represented by a singular net there must be two transitions (a 1 and a 2 ) in the distribution. One for each possible set of tokens involved in the transition, both labelled with a.
We can prove that a singular net distribution of N indeed describes the course of tokens individually: Suppose {S} S∈S is an SN-distribution of N andN is the parallel composition of this distribution (in general different from N ).
◮ Lemma 36. For every sequence of transitions κ in N , there exists a sequence ξ inN with
Proof. We prove this by induction over |κ|: For κ = ǫ define ξ = ǫ. The reached markings agree by construction. Now let κ = κ ′ t. By induction there exists a valid sequence ξ ′ inN and
Since t is enabled after κ ′ we know that pre
Now by the definition of a distribution there must be a transition t 
. This is always possible.
We then throw away every unreachable place. It is easy to check that this construction terminates and generates a valid SN-distribution. With bound
. These bounds are tight. ◭
Reduction with Singular Nets
The parallel composition of an SN-distribution is always sliceable. We can generalize the previous translation from slice distributions to SNdistributions. The important idea is that we can generalize a branching process by refining the labels. Once we fixed a distribution we can label transitions in the branching process by not only their counterparts in the original net but by nodes in the SN-distribution. Formally, a generalized branching process of a Petri net N with SN distribution {S} S∈S is the branching process of the parallel composition of the SN-distribution. Generalized branching processes refine the labelling:
is the complete branching process of N .
We can now do the same translation as in the beginning of Sec. 5 but work with SN distributions instead of slice distributions. We only have to account for one obstacle: In an SN distribution a transition in the original net might be copied. If we would treat a singular net like a slice this would give the controller too much power, since it can distinguish between equally π-labelled transitions and therefore restrict the behavior in a way that the strategy of the Petri game cannot. We fix this by restricting the commitment sets in each process to transitions in the original game instead of the copies in the SN distribution. From such a commitment set all copies of a transition are allowed. This forces the controller to either allow all copies of a transition or none. We are still able to translate strategies and controllers in both directions: Since justified refusal holds in the strategy either all or no equally labelled transitions are enabled. The controller can hence choose appropriate commitment sets. In the converse direction the restriction of the commitment sets to original transitions instead of copies guarantees that justified refusal will hold in the strategy.
C Formal Reduction of Control Games to Petri Games
In this appendix section we will define and prove the reduction of control games to Petri games formally. We formalize the deadlock detection, introduce notation, translate strategies to controllers and controllers to strategies, enforce the choosing of commitment sets, and give a lower bound.
C.1 Formal Deadlock Detection
We introduce a losing state bad p DL for every process and mark it as losing. We want to consider every possible choice of commitment sets that deadlocks the system. We consider every marking M in G C s.t. there is no transition enabled in M . This will only contain environment places (i.e., with chosen commitment set), i.e., M = {(q p , A p )} p∈P . If there is an action enabled in (q p ) p∈P then this is a deadlock caused by the commitment sets. We hence introduce a transition t
The marking M contains only environment places and can hence not be forbidden by the strategy. This global deadlock configuration must hence be avoided by the strategy. Since these markings characterize exactly the deadlock situations the only way to terminate for the strategy is to terminate in a marking that corresponds to a final configuration in the automaton. We give the proof in the context of strategy-equivalence below.
C.2 Notation
We define the auxiliary mapping ζ : P → p∈S S p assigning to each place in G C a state in C in the obvious way:
We can extend this definition to markings by defining for each marking M a corresponding global state in the asynchronous automaton by:
For every set of concurrent places C in G C we denote with past T (C) the transitions in the causal past of C as a partially ordered set (a poset). For a place q we again use the abbreviation past T (q) for past T ({q}). For a sequence transitions we define :
Since only removes τ -transitions we can extend it to past T (C) and consider partially ordered sets instead of totally ordered sets. The key observation is that (past T (C)) (viewed as a partially ordered set) is exactly a trace in C. We can use this notion to define our bisimulation. This is independent of the specific strategy or controller which again gives us a stronger statement than required in the definition of strategy-equivalence. We define the bisimulation as M ≈ R e iff (past T (M )) = e. This relates a marking M with an execution trace if they are reached by the same observable play (ignoring τ ). For these situations, the strategy and controller should make the same decision. By construction of G C it is obvious that if two global states (markings in Petri games, plays in control games) are reached with the same observable transitions/actions they have the same label, i.e., the underlying playing arena is in a comparable state:
Proof. Follows since post
A branching process of a Petri net and the explicit local view of a global play both capture the causal past. This is expressed by the following fact. If a marking is reached with some sequence of observable transitions then each process observes exactly the parts that are in the causal past of the place that corresponds to this process. This captures the idea that a place in a branching process caries the complete causal past.
◮ Lemma 42. For any marking M in a branching process of G C and place q ∈ M with process p, i.e., ζ(λ(q)) ∈ S p , it holds that view p ( (past T (M ))) = view p ( (past T (q))) = (past T (q)).
Proof. All transitions t in past T (M ) that are not in past T (q) are completely unrelated to the transitions of p. It is possible to first fire past T (q) and then all the remaining transitions. All the transitions that are not in past T (q) are not from Σ p . By construction of G C concurrent transitions are also independent w.r.t. I. Hence (past T (M )) = (past T (q)) r where r contains the remaining transitions. All transitions in past T (q) are causally related with the unique transition t ∈ pre σ (q). Uniqueness follows from the definition of occurrence nets. By construction of G C they can hence not be removed from past T (q) without violating the dependency relation. Hence view p ( (past T (M ))) = (past T (q)). Analog, view p ( (past T (q))) = (past T (q)) follows with the same argument. ◭
C.3 Translating Strategies to Controllers
Given a controller ̺ for C we define a strategy σ ̺ for G C . From the causal past of a node this function reconstructs a play in C. We can now define the strategy:
We create places for the initial marking In σ̺ and extend λ s.t. λ(In σ̺ ) = In N .
Now suppose there is a reachable marking M that has not yet been processed in the so far constructed strategy. Let S = {q ∈ M | λ(q) ∈ P S } be the system places in M . If S = ∅: For every q ∈ S: q belongs to a process, i.e., λ(q) ∈ S p for process p. Collect the trace u = (past T (q)) in the already constructed strategy. We again do a case distinction:
u is a ̺-compatible play and state p (u) = λ(q). Now f p (view p (u)) = A ⊆ act(state p (u)) ∩ Σ sys . Add a transition t ′ with λ(t ′ ) = τ (statep(u),A) and a new place q ′ with λ(q ′ ) = (state p (u), A) and add the flow s.t. q ∈ pre σ̺ (t ′ ) and q ′ ∈ post σ̺ (t ′ ) (if these nodes did not already exist). Otherwise: Stop the creation. This case will never occur After this has been done continue with an new unprocessed marking.
If S = ∅:
x a 1 an Figure 10 Control game C where every strategy-equivalent Petri game (with an equal number of player) must be of exponential size. The dotted action (x) is uncontrollable. All other actions a1, · · · , an are controllable.
For every process p ∈ P we introduce an environment place final p . The transitions moves the token of the involved process to this final place: post G ch C (t ch (s,A) ) = {final p } ∪ {deadlock} where p is the process with s ∈ S p . By moving to the challenge place the environment can hence allow every player that has chosen some commitment set to terminate. Every player that refuses to choose a commitment set hence creates a global deadlock. In Fig. 9 the challenge-transitions are the ones in the orange box. 
Bad transitions
We refer to a transition as bad if its postset contains a bad place. We extend the flow such that every bad transition also contains the safety place in its preset and A in its postset. In Fig. 9 these are the transitions in the blue box.
We can extend our construction from above (G C ) with this challenger. Call this game G ch C . The decisions of the environment whether it wants to challenge a local deadlock or a safety violation is only known to the challenger. The system strategy can hence not depend on the decision. It still needs to win the regular safety game since the environment could otherwise challenge the safety objective by moving to safety. If any system place decides to not choose a commitment set the challenger can challenge the deadlock by moving to the deadlock place. Every other process could hence be moved to a final state (one of the possible moves). This would result in a global deadlock since the process has chosen to not use any commitment set. Note that as soon as a deadlock is challenged the game is won if there are no deadlocks (since translations leading to a bad state are blocked).
◮ Theorem 58. The reduced game G ch C has a winning strategy iff G C has a winning strategy where every system place always chooses a commitment set.
Proof. Follows from previous considerations. ◭
C.6 Lower Bound
Consider the control game C in Fig. 10 . The initial state has several outgoing controllable actions and one outgoing uncontrollable action. In any strategy-equivalent Petri game there must be a state from which any combination of controllable actions (a 1 , · · · , a n ) and the uncontrollable action x is possible. This place must be from the environment which results in an exponential number of places.
For our lower bound we need the additional assumption that there are no infinite sequences of τ -translations possible in a winning strategy. For reachability objectives this can be naturally prevented. For safety we need to assume it. There is in fact strategy-equivalent Petri game (to Fig. 10 ) of polynomial size (it permits possibly infinite τ -transition sequences). The presented reduction is also applicable to reachability objectives. Suppose G is a strategy-equivalent Petri game (to C) with one player (token).
◮ Lemma 59. For every ∅ = B ⊆ {a 1 , · · · , a n } there is a place q B s.t. post G (q B ) = B ∪ {x} (where possible copies of transitions are identified with the action).
Proof. Choose ̺ as the (winning) controller that allows exactly the controllable actions in B and σ as the bisimilar (winning) strategy. Now let M = {q} be the marking that is reached by firing as many τ -transitions as possible from the initial marking. By assumption this exists. From the bisimulation we know that post σ (q) = B∪{x} and therefore B∪{x} ⊆ post N (λ(q)). We claim that λ(q) is an environment place. Suppose it is not, i.e., it is a system place. Then we modify σ such that it does not allow x from this place (otherwise identical 
